An Econometric Analysis of Trends in Research Joint Venture Activity. by Albert N. Link et al.
Working Papers in Economics
Department of Economics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 110 8
th Street, Troy, NY, 12180-3590, USA. Tel: +1-
518-276-6387; Fax: +1-518-276-2235; URL: http://www.rpi.edu/dept/economics/; E-Mail: keenak@rpi.edu
An Econometric Analysis of Trends in Joint Venture
Activity
Albert N. Link








For more information and to browse and download further Rensselaer Working Papers in
Economics, please visit: http://www.rpi.edu/dept/economics/www/workingpapers/An Econometric Analysis
of Trends in Research Joint Venture Activity
Albert N. Link
Department of Economics
University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Greensboro, NC  27412
Tel: (336) 334 5463
al_link@uncg.edu
David Paton
Nottingham University Business School
Nottingham NG8 1BB
United Kingdom










* Corresponding  author
-paper to be submitted to the special issue of Managerial and Decision Economics on
“The Contribution of Edith Penrose to Research in Strategy and Economics.”
This research was funded by the National Science Foundation, Science Resources Studies
Division.  We gratefully acknowledge comments from Susan Cozzens, John Jankowski, Adam
Jaffe, Geoff Shephard, and participants at the November 2000 CNRS/CREST/CEPR/NBER
International Conference on Technology Policy and Innovation in Paris, the February 2001
Network of Industrial Economists Conference at the University of London-Royal Holloway, the
June 2001 DRUID Nelson and Winter Conference, and the October 2001 National Science
Foundation Workshop on Intellectual Property Protection Mechanisms and Research
Partnerships.1
Abstract
Edith Penrose was one of the first scholars to point out that firms may need to rely on
research joint ventures (RJVs) to acquire access to resources that can help them achieve and
sustain a competitive advantage.  We estimate an econometric model of the propensity of firms
to disclose their intension to engage in RJVs, in order to explain the recent precipitous decline in
RJVs filed with the U.S. Department of Justice.  We find that RJV activity is inversely related to
the competitive position of U.S. firms in global high-technology industries and that the
establishment of the U.S. Commerce Department’s Advanced Technology Program (ATP)
induced a structural change in the propensity of firms to engage in RJVs.  Thus, two factors may
explain the recent downturn in RJV filings: a substantial improvement in U.S. global
performance in high-technology markets and a sharp decline in ATP funding.
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of Trends in Research Joint Venture Activity
I.   Introduction
In the early 1980s, there was growing concern in the United States regarding the pervasive
slowdown in productivity growth and the concomitant decline in the global competitiveness of
American firms in key high technology industries.  One of the alleged culprits of the downturn in
economic performance was a decline in the rate of technological innovation.  As noted in a
November 18, 1983, House report concerning the proposed Research and Development Joint
Ventures Act of 1983 (HR 4043):
The United States, only a decade ago, with only five percent of the world’s
population, was generating about 75 percent of the world’s technology.  Now, the
U.S. share has declined to about 50 percent and in another ten years … it may be
down to only 30 percent. … The encouragement and fostering of joint research
and development ventures are needed responses to the problem of declining U.S.
productivity and international competitiveness.
In an April 6, 1984, House report on the Joint Research and Development Act of 1984
(HR 5041), the alleged benefits of joint research and development were clearly articulated for the
first time:
Joint research and development, as our foreign competitors have learned, can be
procompetitive.  It can reduce duplication, promote the efficient use of scarce
technical personnel, and help to achieve desirable economies of scale. … [W]e
must ensure to our U.S. industries the same economic opportunities as our
competitors, to engage in joint research and development, if we are to compete in
the world market and retain jobs in this country.
The National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) was subsequently enacted on October
11, 1984 (PL 98-462) “to promote research and development, encourage innovation, stimulate3
trade, and make necessary and appropriate modifications it the operation of the antitrust laws.”
1
The NCRA established a registration process, later expanded by the National Cooperative
Research and Production Act (NCRPA) of 1993 (PL 103-42), under which firms wishing to
engage in research joint ventures (RJVs) can disclose their research intentions to the Department
of Justice.
2  Firms generate two major benefits from such voluntary filings: (i) if subjected to
criminal or civil action they are evaluated under a rule of reason that determines whether the
venture improves social welfare; and (ii) if found to fail a rule-of-reason analysis, they are
subject to actual rather than treble damages.
3
As shown in Figure 1, the number of firms filing RJVs with the U.S. Department of
Justice increased virtually monotonically from the inception of the NCRA through 1995, and has
since declined precipitously.  There are several alternative interpretations of this trend.  One
interpretation is that the incentives embodied in the NCRA are no longer sufficient to stimulate
the formation of joint research projects. Another explanation of the decline in RJVs is that U.S.
firms have experienced difficulties managing collaborative research and thus, have abandoned
such alliances.    Finally, it might also signify that RJVs are no longer an effective organizational
form.
One of the first scholars to point out that firms may need to rely on research joint
ventures to acquire access to resources that can help them achieve and sustain a competitive
                                                   
1 This purpose is stated as a preamble to the Act.  For an historical perspective on the NCRA see Scott (1989) and
Link, Siegel, and Paton (2002).
2 We use the term RJV to refer to a collaborative research arrangement through which firms jointly acquire technical
knowledge.  This usage of the term RJV is more general than employed in the theoretical literature.  See, for
example, Kamien, Muller, and Zang (1992) and Combs (1993).
3 Filing with the Department of Justice is distinct from the decision of whether to form an RJV in the first place.  For
a theoretical analysis of the formation decision, see, for example, Katz (1986).  Economic theory always applies a
rule-of-reason approach to antitrust issues.  One of the primary focuses of the theoretical literature on cooperative
R&D agreements has been to identify the conditions under which an RJV will be welfare enhancing.  For a review
of this literature, see Hagedoorn, Link and Vonortas (2000).  However, the theoretical literature does not address the4
advantage was Edith Penrose (1959).  Penrose asserted that in order to achieve a competitive
advantage, a firm’s resources must be rare, non-substitutable, and difficult for other firms to
imitate.  To maximize the return on these resources, firms may need to gain access to external
complementary resources (e.g., technological resources) that can only be acquired through
formal partnerships with another organization (Richardson (1972)).  As this resource-based view
of the firm has spread, a burgeoning theoretical and empirical literature of the antecedents and
consequences of research partnerships has emerged from Penrose's seminal book (see Hagedoorn
et al. (2000) and Caloghirou et al. (2003))
In this light of this, the purpose of this paper is to understand the underlying economic
rationale for the decline in the incidence of filed RJVs in the USA.  To accomplish this objective,
we outline and estimate a time series econometric model of the propensity of firms to file their
RJV intensions.  Our framework also provides some insights regarding related complementary
policy initiatives that were designed to promote cooperative research.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the econometric
model.  Empirical results are presented in Section III.  The concluding section of the paper
discusses the implications of our findings.
II.   Econometric Model
We hypothesize that there are several key determinants of the propensity of firms to
disclose their intentions to engage in collaborative research.  First, firms may participate in
collaborative research projects as a strategic response to competitive pressures from abroad.
Specifically, when high-technology firms encounter enhanced global competition they may be
                                                                                                                                                                        
private decision of whether to file with the Department of Justice, that is to announce publicly the formation of the
RJV, and to then have that filing made public through publication in the Federal Register.5
more inclined to develop partnerships with domestic rivals who are facing a similar global threat.
Such alliances could enable companies to reduce innovation costs and accelerate the rate of
product or process development.
4  Also, when U.S. firms are experiencing such competitive
pressure, they might assume that the federal government will be much less aggressive in pursing
antitrust violations.  Indeed, as noted earlier, government authorities explicitly mentioned a
desire to relax antitrust enforcement regarding collaborative R&D in the enabling NCRA
legislation. Thus, we conjecture that there is an inverse relationship between the global
competitive position of U.S. high-technology firms and their propensity to file RJVs.
5
We also hypothesize that firms may participate in RJVs as a substitute for internal
research projects.  Economic theory predicts that firms have a stronger incentive to collaborate
when the nature of the research is closer to basic, as opposed to the development end of the R&D
spectrum.
6  Furthermore, the greater risk and uncertainty associated with basic research provides
an additional incentive for firms to collaborate on research projects.  Thus, we expect to observe
a positive relationship between the percentage of R&D expenditure that is allocated to
development and the likelihood of disclosing their RJV activities.
7
We also hypothesize that the propensity of firms to participate in RJVs is related to
overall economic conditions.  Specifically, we expect that such R&D investments are counter-
                                                   
4 See Hagedoorn, Link, and Vonortas (2000) for a review of this theoretical literature.
5 Of course, the law of comparative advantage suggests that not all industries will face the same competitive
pressure from abroad at the same time.  However, we hypothesize through this variable that competitive pressure per
se will relax antitrust enforcement thus leading to fewer RJV disclosures.
6 See Link and Bauer (1989) for a theoretical explanation.  Briefly, Link and Bauer argue (p. 76) that firms engaging
in cooperative research have their own incentives for directing their investments toward basic research.  Since basic
research has more public good characteristics than applied research or development, firms would not be able to
appropriate fully the resulting knowledge if the basic research were conducted privately.  Hence, they may be more
willing to share in those basic costs.
7 Implicit in this hypothesis is the assumption that firms that engage in collaborative research also make that
collaboration public through their filings.  Hertzfeld, Link, and Vonortas (forthcoming) provide evidence in support
of this assumption.  They fined that while firms are involved in more collaborative ventures than they file with the
U.S. Department of Justice, the non-filed collaborations are generally very narrow in scope, short-term in length,6
cyclical.  That is, when the economy is weak, firms may lack sufficient internal resources to
finance long-term R&D projects.  In such situations, they may be more likely to rely on
cooperative research arrangements to generate new technical knowledge, and because of their
strategic nature of these arrangements to disclose them to gain antitrust protection.
Alternatively, when economic conditions are favorable, they may use profits or retained earnings
as a cushion to support internal research projects.  Thus, we anticipate observing an inverse
relationship between proxies for the business cycle and RJV activity.
8
Lastly, there is also the possibility that firms may use mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as
a substitute for formal RJVs, particularly when the proposed research partner is small and in
need of complementary assets (e.g., marketing and distribution) to successfully commercialize an
innovation that arises from the research project.
9  Relatedly, it is conceivable that companies,
who have engaged in RJVs, in the aftermath of NCRA or other initiatives to promote
collaborative R&D, may develop long-lasting relationships with their research partners.  At some
point, they may wish to permanently internalize these relationships.  If mergers and acquisitions
do indeed constitute an alternative to RJVs, we would expect to observe an inverse relationship
between filed RJVs and M&A activity.
Based on the preceding discussion, the propensity to file an RJV can be expressed as:
(1)  RJV = f (TECHCOMP, DEVINT, BCYC, M&A, Z) = f (X)
                                                                                                                                                                        
and unrelated to long-run strategic research strategies.  These “informal” relationships come about, generally, to
solve very specific technical problems related to production.
8 Relatedly, Ghosal and Gallo (2001) show that antitrust enforcement by the Department of Justice is counter-
cyclical.  This finding complements our argument that firms are more likely to disclose their collaborative research
intentions when the economy turns down.
9 See Link (1988) for preliminary evidence on this.  Also, Kang and Johansson (2000) argue from a global
perspective that M&As may take place to provide the initiating firm with needed intangible assets, including
technology, which we argue could alternatively be obtained through collaboration.7
where TECHCOMP is a proxy for the competitive position of U.S. high-technology firms in
global markets, DEVINT  refers to the percentage of industry-funded R&D devoted to
development activity (the “D” of R&D),  BCYC is a proxy for the business cycle, M&A
represents the number of mergers and acquisitions, and Z denotes a vector of additional control
variables.
More specifically, we estimate the following time series econometric model:
(2)   RJVt = β 0 + β 1 TECHCOMPt + β 2  DEVINTt + β 3 BCYCt + β 4  M&A + β 5  DGOV1 +
                    β 6  DGOV2 + ε t
where ε t is a disturbance term.
Definitions of the variables in equation (2) are provided in Table 1.  Two dummy
variables have been added to equation (2) to control for institutional anomalies that affected the
processing of RJV disclosures by federal officials: a temporary closure in the unit of the
Department of Justice that is responsible for Federal Register notices of disclosure (DGOV1)
and a temporary furlough of government employees that also interrupted the filing of disclosure
notices (DGOV2).
Note  al so  that  our   dependent   variabl e,  RJV,   is  a  count  var iable—the  num ber   of   new  RJVs
di  sclosed in the Federal   Regi ster  each  mont h.     T hus,  we  consi der ed  a  Poi sson  and  a  negat ive
bi nomial  (NB),  or  gener ali zed  Poisson,  speci ficati on  of   equation  (1) .
10  The basi  c Poi  sson model as
appl ied to RJV fil ings  is: 




                                                   
10  See  Haus man ,  H all,  and   G rilich es   (1 984 ).8
wher  e y  = RJV and ln(λ ) = f(X),   the  det er minist ic  funct ion  of  X from equati  on  (1) .    The  Poi sson
di st ributi on  has  the  followi ng  property:  E( y)   =  Var (y)  =  λ , condi ti onal  on  X.  T  his rest rictive
di st ributi onal  assum pti on  is  relaxed  in  the  NB  distr ibution,   which  allows  Var  (y)  >  E(y),  the
pr opert y  known  as  “over -di spersion”  or  “extr a-P oisson  vari at ion.”    T he  NB  speci ficat ion
general izes  λ  to be distr ibuted  as  a  Gamm a  random   variabl e  with  paramet er s 
) f(x e  and a shape
parameter α .  As shown in Winkelmann and Zimmerman (1995), the resulting likelihood
function for y is:
(4)   L(y) = 
y ) p - (1 p
y







wher e  δ  = 1/α  and p = (1+α (
) f(x exp ))
− 1.  The Poisson distribution (and hence the property of no
over-dispersion) corresponds to the special case of α  = 0.  For each NB regressi  on,   we computed
the χ
2 statistic (  wit  h one degree of freedom)   for the test   of   the nul  l hypothesi  s that α  = 0; t  hat   i s,  that
the dat  a are di  str  ibuted as Poisson (condi  tional on X).    Since we can rej  ect   this restr  iction in each
case, we report only the NB esti  mates of   vari  ant  s of equat  ion (2). 
11
III.   Empirical  Results
A potentially important econometric concern in any time series regression is whether the
variables are stationary.  Unfortunately, it is not clear from the literature whether standard tests
for stationarity apply with count data, as opposed to a continuous variable.  This lack of clarity in
the literature precludes a formal treatment of this issue here.  However, as shown in Table 2,
standard stationarity tests suggest that the key variables in our model: the dependent variable9
(RJV) and the proxy for the global competitiveness of U.S. firms (TECHCOMP) are both
stationary.
Our method is to use information criteria to establish the appropriate lag order for the
tests.  The criteria we use are the Akaike Information Criteria and the Schwarz Information
Criteria.  As discussed in Patterson (2000), there is some evidence to suggest that the Akaike
Information Criteria tends to over-parameterize the model, so a lag structure based on the based
on the Schwarz Information Criteria may be more appropriate.  For RJV, we also conducted a
Philips-Perron (1988) test, assuming a lag order of 9, yielding a test statistic of –10.322, which is
significant at the .01 level.  Although we cannot reject non-stationarity for the other independent
variables, tests on the residuals from OLS estimation of the model provide informal evidence in
favor of cointegration.  The fact that our base econometric results are robust to alternative lag
structures provides additional support for this conclusion, so we proceed with conventional
estimation procedures.
Negative binomial parameter estimates of equation (2) are presented in Table 3. Each
independent variable is constructed as a weighted average of the current and previous year’s
values, although alternative lag structures were used and the findings do not differ significantly
from the findings presented here.
12  We also report the χ
2 statistic  f or  the  t est   of   t he  nul l  hypothesis
that   the dat  a are di  str  ibuted as P  oisson, whi  ch is deci  sively r  ejected. 
Several findings emerge from this table.  Consistent with our expectations, the coefficient
on TECHCOMP is negative and significant.  That is, there appears to be an inverse relationship
between a proxy for the competitiveness of U.S. firms in global high-technology industries and
the formation and disclosure of RJVs.  We also find a positive association between the
                                                                                                                                                                        
11 All results are available from the authors upon request.
12 The results from alternative lag structures are available from the authors upon request.10
percentage of R&D devoted to development (DEVINT) and RJVs.  This result is consistent with
our notion that formal collaborative research projects constitute a substitute for internal basic
research projects. Contrary to our expectations, a positive and significant coefficient on our
proxy for the business cycle (BCYC) implies that RJV filings are actually procyclical. However,
a negative and significant coefficient on M&A appears to confirm our conjecture of a negative
association between mergers and acquisitions and RJVs.
Next, we assess the structural stability of the parameter estimates of the regression
equation, in light of three exogenous events.  These events occurred during the sample period,
and could have induced a structural change in the propensity of firms to disclose their RJV
activities.  One event was the election of President Clinton in November 1992, which signified a
change from Republican to Democratic control of the Department of Justice.  Democrats have
historically been more aggressive in antitrust enforcement than Republicans; Clinton’s election
may have signaled to industry a stricter enforcement of antitrust policy and thus, encouraged
firms to seek protection from potential litigation with regard to their involvement in collaborative
research ventures.
In addition to the change in administration, two relevant policy interventions relating to
RJV formations also occurred during the sample period.  The U.S. Commerce Department’s
Advanced Technology Program (ATP) was established as part of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 (PL 100-418).  Its key goals are:
[T]o assist U.S. businesses to improve their competitive position and promote
U.S. economic growth by accelerating the development of a variety of pre-
competitive generic technologies by means of grants and cooperative agreements.11
The ATP received its initial funding in 1990 and announced its initial awards in March 1991.  A
second initiative to promote collaborative research was the aforementioned NCRPA of 1993,
which broadened the scope of the NCRA to include joint research and production ventures.
To test whether these three events induced a structural change in equation (2), we
considered several stability tests.  The usual practice in assessing the constancy of regression
coefficients over time is to impose on the equation prior information concerning the event that is
hypothesized to cause the structural change.  The researcher then either estimates separate
regressions, given this assumed breakpoint, or a single equation with dummy variables.  The
most popular test for structural change is the Chow test.  One problem with the Chow test is that
it requires the assumption that the disturbance variance is the same in both regressions.  As a
result, a new generation of tests of structural change (Ghsyels, Guay, and Hall (1997)) are
typically based on the composition of Wald, likelihood ratio (LR), and Lagrange-multiplier-type
(LM) tests, which do not require such restrictive assumptions.   The most commonly used of
these is the Wald test, which Bai and Perron (1998) have shown can be used to identify multiple
structural changes.
In cont  rast to the Chow and Wal  d tests,   the Brown,   Durbin,   and Evans (BDE,   1975) test for
the  str uct ur al  stabi lit y  of  regressi on  par am eters  does  not   require  prior  inf orm ati on  concerning  the
tr  ue point   of struct  ural change.  Under   this method,   an anal  ysi  s of the cumulat  ive sum of squar  ed
resi duals  (CUSUMSQ)  from  the  regression  determi nes  wher e,  if   at   al l,   a  str uctur al  br eak  or   shif t
occurs.     T hus,  an  at tracti ve  pr opert y  of  t he  BDE  CUS UMS Q  t est  i s  t hat  i t  all ows  the  dat a  t o  identi fy
when the t  rue point of str  uctur  al change occurs.
13
The basic  intui tion  underl yi ng  the  BDE  test is that if the structure of   the regressi  on equat  ion12
vari  es accor  ding to an index, time in this case, the residuals wil  l shi  ft,   compared to the constant
coef ficients  model .    The  BDE   test  uses  the  test   st at ist ic  Sr, which is deri  ved from   the  nor mal ized
cumulat ive  sum  of  squar ed  residual s  from  a  r ecursi ve  estim at ion  model:
where wi are the orthogonalized recursive residuals, k is the number of regressors, and N is the
number of observations. Sr has a beta distribution with expected value, µ = (r-k) / (N-k).  With
constant coefficients, a graph of Sr will coincide with its mean-value line, within a confidence
interval (± C0 + (r+k) / (N-k)), where C0 is Pyke’s modified Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic.  The
actual and expected value of the test statistic, Sr  and E(Sr) can be calculated, for each
observation.  The absolute value of the difference between Sr and E(Sr) is  also computed.  If the
regression coefficients do not vary over time, then these differences will fall within the specified
confidence region.  When the value of (Sr – E(Sr)) exceeds C0, we have identified a point where
structural change has occurred.
14
As illustrated in Figure 2, a plot of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic reveals that the
structure of equation (2) is not stable.  It appears as though a statistically significant structural
break (at a 5% level of significance) occurred in December 1991.  Based on our a priori
judgment of events that could induce a structural change in the propensity to disclose joint
venture intentions, only the creation of the ATP occurred prior to December 1991.  In fact,
                                                                                                                                                                        
13 Th es e  tests  hav e  b een  employ ed on time ser  ies and  cr oss -section al  data  to  an aly ze  th e  s tab ility   of   s uch   econ  omic
ph en omena  as   th e  d em and   fo r  mon ey  (H eller  an d  K han   1 979 ),  ag gregate  output  f luctuations   (McConn ell  and  Per ez-
Qu ir os  200 0) ,  r etu rn s  to  R&D   in ves tm ent  (Lin k  1 980 ),  an d  s ales  tax   r evenue  ( And ers ,  Siegel,  and   Yaco ub  199 8) .
14 An alternative summary test of structural stability, which is also based on the cumulative sum of residuals, was
suggested by Hansen (1992).














=   
++13
awards from ATP’s first solicitation were made in March 1991, and a second solicitation was
announced in September 1991.
To assess the economic effects of this ATP-induced structural shift, we estimated two
new variants of the econometric model.  In the first variant of the model, we defined a dummy
variable, DATP, which is 0 from March 1985 through December 1991, and 1 thereafter.  We then
interacted the ATP dummy with the variables TECHCOMP and DEVINT.  These findings are
reported in column (1) of Table 4.  Note that the coefficient on the interaction of TECHCOMP
and the ATP dummy is negative and significant.  The magnitude of the interaction effect (-0.764)
is much stronger than the marginal effect of TECHCOMP (-0.043).  This result suggests that the
activities of the ATP have significantly enhanced the responsiveness of firms to competitive
pressures in high technology industries through collaboration.  We also observe that once we
control for the effect of the ATP, the previously captured substitution effect from in-house
research to collaborative research and the cyclical effect are no longer significant.  If we estimate
the model without the interaction term between DEVINT and DATP (not shown on the table), the
coefficient on M&A is negative and significant, while the coefficient on DAPT is strongly
positive and significant.  The latter result suggests that the ATP has an absolute positive effect on
RJV disclosures, ceteris paribus.
In the second new variant, we split the sample in December 1991, based on the BDE
CUSUMSQ test statistic indicating a structural change during that month, and re-estimated
equation (2) separately for each time period.   These findings are reported in columns (2) and (3)
of Table 4.    In both periods, we find that the coefficient on TECHCOMP is negative and
significant, confirming our earlier result regarding RJVs a strategic response to global
competition in high technology industries.  However, the magnitude of this effect is again14
significantly greater in the post-ATP period.
15  Note, however, that splitting the sample appears
to weaken our earlier findings regarding the responsiveness of RJVs to the intensity of R&D
devoted to development and the business cycle.  Indeed, we find that that the only other
statistically significant determinant of RJV filings is M&A, but this result holds only for the pre-
ATP period.
IV.   Interpretation of Results and Conclusions
Our empirical evidence sheds some light on possible causes of the precipitous decline in
RJV filings with the U.S. Department of Justice since 1995.   At first glance, it appears that this
downturn could be an indication that the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 has reached
the limits of its effectiveness, in terms of eliciting new RJVs.  However, our econometric
analysis suggests that the Act is indeed fulfilling one of its intentions, namely to provide an
innovation-friendly environment (e.g., safe harbor from antitrust concerns) for firms to respond
to global competition in high-technology industries.  In each variant of the model, we found an
inverse relationship between global competitiveness in high-technology markets and the
propensity of U.S. firms to engage in collaborative research projects.  In this regard, it appears
that RJVs constitute an effective organizational form to enhance innovative activity.
More importantly, our empirical evidence suggests that two factors might explain the
recent downturn in RJV filings: a substantial improvement in the global performance of U.S.
firms in high-technology industries and a precipitous decline in funding for the ATP.  According
to the National Science Foundation (National Science Board 2000), the global market share of
U.S. firms in high-technology industries increased from 29.2 percent in 1994 to 37.5 percent in
                                                   
15 The difference in the pre- and post-ATP coefficients on TECHCOMP is significant at the .05 level.15
1998.  The U.S. Commerce Department reports that the budget for the ATP declined from a peak
of $512 million in 1995 to $212 million in 1998.
Our finding that a structural change in the regression equation occurs soon after the
establishment of the ATP has several interpretations, which are all consistent with the notion that
the ATP stimulated the formation of additional RJVs.  First, since one mission of the ATP is to
encourage cooperative research activity, our findings imply that it is succeeding in that regard.
Second, the establishment of the ATP may have provided a signal to firms that Congress and the
Administration will support collaborative research relationships even beyond the legislated
protection afforded RJVs under the NCRA.  And third, there is a growing body of case-based
evidence that suggests additionality, namely that firms that receive ATP support for collaborative
research are more likely to engage on their own in additional collaborative activities (Feldman
and Kelley 2003, Link 1996).
16
Several caveats to our empirical findings should be noted.  First, RJV is a count variable,
and not a measure of the resources devoted to these endeavors.  Unfortunately, data on the
resources devoted to an RJV are not available.   Furthermore, it would be useful to have outcome
or performance measures for each disclosed RJV as well as for non-disclosed RJVs, but again
such information is not available. Also, it might be worthwhile to examine the underlying
heterogeneity that is currently masked in our aggregate analysis.  For example, some RJVs are
oriented toward process innovation while others are aimed at product innovations.  The nature of
the technologies and the time frame of the research projects will also differ.
We hope that this paper will stimulate further research on the impact of policy initiatives,
such as ATP, on the propensity of firms to engage in collaborative research projects.  This is an
important aspect of policy-induced spillovers that has not attracted much attention in the16
literature.  Finally, it would be useful to extend Penrose’s ideas on the outcomes of RJVs to
public-private partnerships, by examining whether RJVs that receive financial support from the
government are more likely to help firms achieve and sustain a competitive advantage than
comparable privately-funded RJVs.
                                                                                                                                                                        
16 This spillover effect is also discussed in Audretsch and Feldman (1996) and Audretsch and Stephan (1996).17
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Figure 1
Annual Counts of New Research Joint Ventures, 1985-2000
Source:  CORE database (National Science Board 2000).
Notes:   Data are available in the CORE database through 2000; however, our econometric analysis
























































































Variable Definition Data Source
RJV Monthly Number of RJVs filed with the
U.S. Department of Justice, 1985-1998 *




U.S. Trade Balance in Advanced
Technology Products, monthly, 1985-
1998
U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S.
Trade with Advanced Technology
(see McGuckin et al. 1989).
DEVINT Annual Percentage of Industry-Funded
R&D Allocated to Development, 1985-
1998
National Science Board, Science &
Engineering Indicators 2000, Tables
A2-6 and A2-17 and unpublished
data from NSF
BCYC 12 month Weighted Average of U.S.
Industrial Production Index, (1992=100),
seasonally adjusted, quarterly, 1985-1998.
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve
Bulletin, monthly.
M&A Annual Number of U.S. Mergers and
Acquisitions, 1985-1998
Thomson Financial Securities Data,
Mergers & Corporate Transactions
Database
DGOV1 =1 July 1995 to November 1995; 0
otherwise
Interviews with Pre-Merger group at
Department of Justice
DGOV2 =1 in December 1995 and January 1996; 0
otherwise
Interviews with Pre-Merger group at
Department of Justice
Notes: *Data are available on RJVs in the CORE database on the day that the RJV was noticed in the
                 Federal Register.  These e data are then aggregated by month.  In January 1985 7 RJVs were
                 filed, in February 1985 22 were filed, and in March 1985 and thereafter for the next several
  years the monthly totals averaged 5 per month.  The 22 filings in February 1985 were the second
  most over the 14-year period;  there were 24 filings in December 1995 just after the pre-merger
  group in the Department of Justice  completed its reorganization and just before the federal
  government furloughed employees for a month.  We interpret January and February 1985 as
  “blips” in the sense that February represents an accumulation of pre-1985 collaborative activity
  that was filed in early January 1985 after the passage of the NCRA and noticed in the Federal
  Register in February 1985.  We delete these two months from our time series, and thus our analysis
  has 166 observations.  We control for the Department of Justice reorganization and government
  furlough periods with  DGOV1 and DGOV2.
                                                   
17 Our prior was that only contemporaneous effects would affect the propensity of firms to disclose their RJV
intensions since this variable proxies short-run investment decisions and short-run antitrust attitudes.
Econometrically, lagged effects on this variable were statistically insignificant.22
Table 2
Stationarity Tests for the Variables in the RJV Model
Unit Root Tests








RJV 9 -1.743 1  5.219*
TECHCOMP 12     -3.321** 1     -2.627***
DEVINT 11 -1.418 12 -1.208
BCYC 1   2.47 1   2.47
M&A 9   1.61 11   2.70
Notes:
* indicates that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the .01 level; ** .05 level; *** .10 level.
Lags are chosen on the basis of the Akaike Information Criteria or the Schwarz Information Criteria.23
Table 3
Negative Binomial Parameter Estimates of the Propensity to File RJVs (Equation (2))
Dependent Variable: Monthly Number of RJVs Filed, 1985-1998

















2(1) (α = 0) 82.31*
n 166
Notes:   Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*   significant at the .01 level;  ** significant at the .05 level24
Figure 2
Plot of Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Statistic (Sr) from Brown-Durbin-Evans
CUSUMSQ Test for Structural Change
                   Sr
Notes: ----- lines indicate the 95% confidence limits for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic derived
                      from the Brown-Durbin Evans CUSUMSQ test for structural change
Date




Negative Binomial Parameter Estimates of the Propensity to File RJVs,
With Controls for ATP-Induced Structural Change
Dependent Variable: Monthly Number of RJVs Filed, 1985-1998














































Log Likelihood -381.95 -157.48 -220.59
χ
2(1) (α = 0) 49.29* 1.28 56.52*
n 166 81 85
Notes:   Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*   significant at the .01 level
          ** significant at the .05 level
              DATP =1 from March 1991 through end of 1998; 0 otherwise.  This breakpoint was identified based on
                            The Brown-Durbin-Evans CUSUMSQ test for structural stability.